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ABSTRACT
In a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive
externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax
collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption,
lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it
reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the
non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic
taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low
compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax
smoothing is not optimal: current taxes will be lower than future taxes.
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1. Introduction
Does one country’s borrowing in an integrated global financial market impose
externalities on other countries? If so, are these spillovers welfare-enhancing or welfare-
reducing? The issue figures prominently in the debate about the merits of the European Union’s
Stability and Growth Pact and is part of the debate on the merits of G3 policy coordination.  Two
broad classes of cross-border public debt externalities are recognised in the literature. The first
are externalities associated with either the occurrence of sovereign debt default or with actions
undertaken by the debtor country or by others to prevent sovereign defaults. The second are
cross-border externalities associated with the transmission of national public debt policies
through their effect on the global risk-free real interest rate; it is this second type of externality
that is the focus of this paper.
We provide an explicitly intertemporal equilibrium model with optimising households
and governments, in which public debt and the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
provide an explicit link between tax decisions today and tax decisions tomorrow. Such
intertemporal models are analytically difficult, especially if they do not exhibit first-order
Ricardian equivalence or debt neutrality. The combination of budget constraints (where changes
in asset stocks enter additively) and equilibrium determination of intertemporal relative prices
(which enter multiplicatively with asset stocks) means that non-linearities are intrinsic. This has
led us to specify the simplest possible ‘supply side’ for the national economies (a perishable
endowment technology), simple household preferences, a representative infinite-lived consumer
with log-linear preferences and a simple source of Ricardian non-equivalence, or absence of debt
neutrality: fiscal transfer costs. We assume that there are increasing and strictly convex real
resource costs of administering and collecting taxes.
The focus of this paper is on real interest rate cross-border spillovers that occur in the1Tax systems have both administrative and enforcement costs borne by the public sector
and compliance, avoidance and evasion costs born by the private sector. To keep the notation
simple, we have chosen to model the fiscal transfer cost here as an administrative cost, borne
solely by the public sector. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) report that the administrative cost of
the US tax system is 0.6 cents per dollar of revenue raised. Slemrod (1996) estimates the
compliance costs to be about 10 cents per dollar collected.  
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absence of sovereign default risk and without strategic interactions between a national fiscal
authority and a national or supranational monetary authority. Our formal model is that of a non-
monetary economy in which every national fiscal authority satisfies its intertemporal budget
constraint. Government spending on goods and services is exogenous. We assume that each
government can commit to a path of taxes, taking the taxes of the other governments as given.
Thus, there is commitment but no international cooperation. We show this non-cooperative
behaviour results in inefficient global equilibria.
Households are infinite-lived and there are no overlapping generations features that could
cause problems of dynamic inefficiency. Each country’s supply side is a simple endowment
economy with a single perishable good. Resources are always fully utilised. There is perfect
international mobility of financial capital. International transmission of national fiscal policy is
only through interest rates. The assumption that prevents our model from exhibiting Ricardian
equivalence, is the presence of increasing and strictly convex tax administration and collection
costs.
1 Taxes are lump-sum; their incidence can not be altered through changes in private
behaviour, but because of the strict convexity of the tax administration and collection costs, the
timing of taxes matters in this model, just as it would with conventional distortionary taxes on
labour income or asset income in models with endogenous labour supply and capital
accumulation. In the formal model, these administration and collection costs are all located in
the public sector. When taxes are negative (government subsidies or transfers) real resource costs
result from private rent-seeking behaviour. Extending the model to include compliance costs2See Buiter and Kletzer (1991). If there is dynamic inefficiency (the real interest rate is
almost always below the real growth rate), then fiscal policy that causes redistribution from the
young can lead to a Pareto improvements. With asymmetric countries, alternative deficit
financing policies would, in general, have international as well as intergenerational distributional
implications.
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borne by the private tax payers, either to comply with or to avoid or evade taxes, would add
notational complexity without changing our qualitative conclusions. 
Without these tax administration and collection costs, our model, with its representative
private agent, would exhibit Ricardian equivalence: any sequence of lump-sum taxes and debt
that satisfies the intertemporal budget constraints would support the same equilibrium for any
given sequence of public spending on goods and services. There would be no international
spillovers. 
If the representative agent assumption were replaced by that of overlapping generations
without a bequest motive, alternative rules for financing a given public spending programme
would give rise to pure pecuniary externalities if there were no tax administration and collection
costs. That is, even with symmetric countries, there could be distributional effects between
generations, but, as long as dynamic inefficiency does not occur, any feasible sequences of lump-
sum taxes and debt support equilibria that are Pareto efficient.
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In the single country special case of our model, the presence of tax administration and
collection costs does not give rise to an inefficiency, as long as one assumes that, in the
counterfactual command economy, resource transfers between the private and public sector
would be subject to the same real fiscal transfer costs as in our market economy. Inefficiency
comes when there is more than one country and each country influences the choice set of the
other countries in a way that is not adequately reflected in market prices.  
Without costly tax administration and collection (or conventional distortionary taxes),3Again, in the case of OLG models, we rule out dynamically inefficient equilibria.  With
optimising governments, dynamic inefficiency does not occur in equilibrium (Buiter and Kletzer
(1991)).
4See the previous footnote.
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alternative government financing rules either have no externalities associated with them (in
models such as ours, which would exhibit debt neutrality) or only purely pecuniary externalities
( in OLG models). These are external effects that, first, are transmitted only through a market
price - the global real interest rate and, second, do not have efficiency implications.
3 Obviously,
these pecuniary externalities will have distributional consequences if some countries are net
lenders while others are net borrowers. 
Distributional effects from policies that change the global interest rate need not have
efficiency implications. It is an implication of the first welfare theorem, that all competitive
equilibria supported by different lump-sum tax-transfer and borrowing schemes are Pareto
efficient.
4 This is true even if a country is large in the world capital market and exploits its
monopoly power. All that is required is that taxes and transfers be lump-sum. Because our model
has a representative agent and taxes are lump-sum, there would be debt neutrality without fiscal
transfer costs. However, with strictly convex fiscal transfer costs, there will be interest rate
spillovers. Our national economies are symmetric and, even when there is costly tax
administration and collection causing alternative government financing policies to affect the
global rate of interest, there are no distributional consequences. Changes in the global interest
rate brought about by domestic tax policy have efficiency effects because they affect the interest
bill faced by governments with outstanding debt. All governments must meet their intertemporal
budget constraint and changes in the interest bill require changes in taxes, now and/or in the
future. We assume that national governments maximise the welfare of their representative5
national consumer and do not internalise any fiscal transfer costs they may impose on foreign
nations. In the presence of fiscal transfer costs, a national government’s financing decision that
raises the world interest rate inflicts a negative externality on the rest of the world if other
governments have positive stocks of debt outstanding. Thus far our model supports the
conventional wisdom.
Where our model departs radically from conventional wisdom is through the mechanism
by which different government financing choices affect interest rates. The conventional wisdom
associates policies that result in larger government deficits with ‘financial crowding out’. That
is, given public spending, larger deficits raise interest rates. In our thoroughly neo-classical
intertemporal model the opposite is true. Lower taxes and larger deficits early on result in a lower
global rate of interest. 
We show that if governments are too small to affect the global interest rate, they minimise
the costs of collecting taxes by smoothing the taxes over time. If they are able to influence the
interest rate and countries have a positive initial stock of debt, then they set a lower tax in the
initial period than in subsequent periods. This is because lower tax distortions in the initial period
than in latter periods imply that aggregate consumption is higher in the initial period than in later
periods. Thus, the interest rate at which the country can borrow in the initial period is lower than
with perfectly smooth taxes and this lowers the debt service on its outstanding debt and, hence,
future tax collection costs.
Relative to the global (cooperative) optimum, non-cooperative countries tax too much
and issue too little debt in the initial period. Reducing current taxes has a positive welfare
spillover, even though it requires the issuance of more debt. Lowering the current interest rate
by lowering current taxes lowers the cost of servicing all countries’ debt and thus reduces all
countries’ need to collect costly taxes. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, countries do not take6
into account this benefit to other countries and they tax too much in the initial period. 
Our conclusion that lack of international cooperation leads to taxes that are initially too
high and public deficits that are initially too small seems to contradict the presumption reflected
in the debt and deficit ceilings of the Stability and Growth Pact that deficits are apt to be too
large. However, we do not want to make too much of the size of the externalities associated with
alternative tax and borrowing policies of national governments in EMU; even the larger EMU
countries are rather small fish in the global financial pond. Our analysis is more relevant to
interaction between the United States, the European Union as a whole and, possibly, Japan and
China. 
There are few papers analysing the welfare economics of international interest-rate
spillovers from national tax and borrowing strategies of national governments using optimising
sequential general equilibrium models. Hamada (1986) and Buiter and Kletzer (1991) state the
problem but do not develop the excessive deficits bias issue. Kehoe (1987,1989) considers the
welfare economics of international fiscal policy cooperation, but in a model where government
budgets are always balanced.
In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we extend the model to consider small l
variations in the households’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We show that as this
elasticity falls, the deviation between cooperative and noncooperative taxes rises. In section 4 we
consider a production economy and constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution preferences.
We show that if the world economy is at a steady state with positive debt, a coordinated reduction
in the current tax financed by higher future taxes improves welfare. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The Model
The model comprises N $ 1 countries, each inhabited by a representative infinite-lived
household and a government. Each period, each household receives an endowment of the single7















private tradeable, non-storable consumption good and each government purchases an exogenous
amount of the private good to produce a public good. The governments finance their purchases
by issuing debt or by taxing their resident households. We assume that the tax system is costly
to administer; the government uses up real resources collecting taxes. All savings is in the form
of privately or publicly issued real bonds. We assume that households are symmetric and that
endowments and government purchases are constant over time. There is perfect international
integration of the national financial markets, and hence, a common world interest rate..
2.1 The households
The country-i household, i = 1,...,N, has preferences over its consumption path given by
where  is its period-t consumption and M 0 (0,1) is its discount factor. c
i
t
The household’s period-t, t = 0,1,... , budget constraint is
where   is the household’s stock of assets (in the form of real bonds) at the start of period t, a
i
t Rt
is (one plus) the interest rate between period t - 1 and period t, W is the household’s per-period
endowment of the good and   is it time-t tax bill. The household’s initial assets,   , are given. N
i
t a0
In addition to satisfying its within-period budget constraint, the household must satisfy
the long-run solvency condition that the present discounted value of its assets is non-negative as
time goes to infinity. The transversality condition associated with its optimisation problem





























t , t ' 0,1,... . (5)
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0, t ' 1,2,... . (6)
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Equations (2) and (3) imply that the present discounted value of the household’s
consumption equals the present discounted value of its (after-tax) income plus its initial assets:
The household chooses its path of asset holdings and its consumption stream to maximise
its utility function (1) subject to its intertemporal budget constraint (4). The solution to its
problem satisfies equation (4) and the Euler equation
Solving the difference equation (5) yields the household’s time-t consumption as a
function of its initial consumption and the t-period interest factor 
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) yields the household’s initial consumption as
a function of its taxes and the interest factors
Substituting equation (6) into equation (1) yields the household’s indirect utility as a9
u i ' lnc
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t%1 ' G % Rtb
i
t , (9)
function of initial consumption and the interest factors
where constants that do not affect the household’s optimisation problem are ignored.
2.2 The government 
The country-i, i = 1,...,N, government’s period-t, t = 0,1,... , budget constraint is
where   is the government’s outstanding debt at the start of period t, G > 0 is its per-period b
i
t
purchase of the consumption good. The amount of resources used up in collecting a tax of N (or
administering a surplus of - N)is given by and (Q/2)N
2,where Q>0.The government’s initial debt
(or credit, if negative), b0, is given. We restrict the parameters of the model so that satisfying
equation (9) is feasible; these restrictions are detailed later in this section.
In addition to satisfying its within-period budget constraint, the government also satisfies
As with the household, this is an implication of the long-run solvency constraint and the
transversality condition associated with the government’s optimisation problem.
Equations (9) and (10) imply that the present discounted value of the government’s
purchases, plus its initial debt, equals the present discounted value of its tax stream, net of
collection costs:10
















where gt :' G % R0b
i
0, t ' 0
G, t >0 .
(11)













, t ' 1,2,.... (14)
2.3 Market clearing
Market clearing requires that the sum of the Nhouseholds’ asset holdings equals the sum
of the N governments’ debt. Thus,
where variables without a superscript denote global averages.
The global resource constraint requires that total household consumption plus total
government purchases of the good plus total resources used up paying the tax equals total
endowments. Thus,
Equation (13) is, of course, also implied by equations (2), (9) and (12). 
Averaging both sides of the Euler equation (6) over the Ncountries gives the period-treal
interest factor as a function of aggregate consumption in periods 0 and period t.
Equations (13) and (14) imply that in equilibrium, the time-t interest factor is solely a function
of time-0 and time-t taxes.11
u i ' lnc
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W % R0b0, t ' 0
W, t >0 .
(16)
Substituting equation (14) into equation (8) gives the country-ihousehold’s indirect utility
as a function of its initial consumption and the path of aggregate consumption:
Substituting equations (12) and (14) into equation (7) gives the household’s initial
consumption as a function of the paths of taxes. The predetermined value of initial government
debt enters as a parameter.
Substituting equation (16) into the indirect utility function (equation (15)) yields
Substituting the global resource constraint (equation (13)) into equation (17) would allow
the household’s indirect utility to be expressed solely as a function of the paths of taxes in the
N countries.
Substituting equation (14) into equation (11) yields the country-i government’s budget
















, t ' 0,1,... .
(18)
max{G,g0} # 1/(2Q), w0 $ 1/Q, W & G >2 / Q, g0 >0 . (19)
Substituting equation (13) into equation (17) would allow the budget constraint to be
expressed solely as a function of the paths of the taxes in the N countries.
2.4 Taxes and revenues
With tax revenues (net of collection costs) bounded in our model and with exogenous real
public consumption spending and endowments, we must impose further restrictions on the
parameter space to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. Thus, we assume
The net tax revenue function,   looks like a Laffer curve, although its shape N & (Q/2)N2
is the result of tax collection costs and not the distortions associated with non-lump sum taxes
and subsidies. It is maximised at N = 1/Q and (net) revenue equals 1/(2Q) at this point. The first
inequality in assumption (19) ensures that it is possible to finance expenditures of Gand g0.This
implies that an equilibrium with no government borrowing from time-1 on is feasible. 
The time-0 budget is balanced with a tax of   := (1 -  )/Q or a tax of   := (1 N
&
0 1 & 2Qg0 N
%
0
+ )/Q. Likewise, the time-t, t > 0, budget is balanced with taxes of   := (1 - 1 & 2Qg0 N&
)/Qor := (1 +  )/Q.The taxes   and N
-are on the “right”, or upward-sloping 1 & 2QG N% 1 & 2QG N
&
0




on the “wrong” or downward-sloping parts of the time-0 and time-t,t>0,net tax revenue curves,
respectively. There is a conventional government budget surplus in country i in period 0 if and







t if and only if N
i [ , ].  0 N& N%
By the resource constraint, equation (13), the upper bound on feasible taxes in a
symmetric equilibrium is   :=  . Assumption (19) implies that the taxes   and Y N (2/Q)(W & G) N
%
0 N%
are strictly less than  , and hence are feasible. By equations (13) and (18), a symmetric Y N
equilibrium with constant taxes has taxes of (1 ±  )/Q. By assumption 1 & 2Q[G % (1 & M)R0b0]
(19), this is feasible. 
We allow for negative taxes, or subsidies. In this case the collection cost is viewed as the
cost of administering the surplus. We rule out, however, the empirically implausible case of an
initial stock of credit that is so large that the government can achieve a balanced budget
(including interest payments) in period zero with a subsidy. The necessary condition for this,g0
> 0, is included in (19).
The variable  , in equation (18) can be interpreted as the period-0 value s
i
t , t ' 0,1,2,...
of the government’s time-t budget surplus (or deficit, if negative), divided by  . For period 0, c0
this surplus is the total surplus and for periods t > 0 it is the primary surplus. We will refer to
as country i’s discounted time-t surplus. s
i
t
From the government’s budget constraint, equation (18), it appears that a rational
government with market power may set taxes on the “wrong” side of the net tax revenue curve,
that is, at a tax higher than 1/Q, the tax that maximises net revenue. To see this suppose that
.Market power gives a country the ability to influence the global interest factor. Holding N
i
t ' 1/Q
other taxes positive, a marginal increase in   causes aggregate period-t consumption to fall. As N
i
t
net revenues are insensitive to taxes at 1/Q, they are unaffected by a marginal increase in the tax




We have the following result. Proofs of this and all other propositions are in the14
Appendix.
Proposition 1.Given  has a unique maximum in  . The maximising tax is decreasing N
j





in the number of countries; as N64it goes to  .If t >0, the maximising tax is an element of  1/Q [1/Q,N%]
and  is increasing (decreasing) below (above) the maximising tax on  . If t = 0, the s
i
t [N&,N%]















if t = 0 and by   if t > 0. If N = 1 and taxes are symmetric then the maximising tax is N(N
if t = 0 and it is   if t > 0. The relationship between important time-t w0 & w
2
0 & YN 2 W & W 2 & YN 2
values is shown in Figure 1. The position of the corresponding time-0 values is similar.
We now show that it cannot be part of an equilibrium for any government to ever set a
tax above the one that maximises its discounted surplus. The strategy of the proof is to show that
if it did so, it could always pick a tax on the other side of the net tax revenue curve that would
provide the same discounted surplus and higher utility.
Proposition 2. It cannot be part of an equilibrium for government i to set its time-t tax higher
than the one that maximises  .s
i
t
3. Dynamic Optimal Taxation
We assume that at time zero, the government in country i can commit to a tax plan





of its household (equation (17)) subject to its budget constraint (equation (18)).
We begin analysing the problem by considering the effects of time-ttaxes on welfare and
the government’s fiscal position. By equations (13) and (17), the marginal change in utility from































, t ' 0,1,... . (20)
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, t ' 0,1,... . (21)
Let taxes be constant across countries. Then equation (16) implies   = [
4
t'0Mt(wt & Nt)/ct
1/( 1 - M). Equation (13) and the definition of st(in equation (18)) implies   =  . (wt & Nt)/ct 1 & st
These results and equation (20) imply that with symmetric taxes
We next show that the marginal (indirect) utility of taxes must be strictly negative.
Proposition 3. A symmetric equilibrium must have mt < 0, t = 0,1,... .
Holding other taxes constant, an increase in time-t taxes has the direct effect of lowering
consumer income in period t and this tends to lower welfare. Suppose Nt > 0. Then a tax increase
lowers available global resources in period tbecause of the higher collection costs. Thus, it raises
the relative price of consumption in period t. This interest rate effect has a positive effect on
welfare if consumers lend to the government in period t(st<0). The direct dominates the interest
rate effect; an increase in the time-t tax lowers within-period welfare at time t. Suppose Nt < 0.
Then a tax increase increases available resources in period tbecause of the lower administration
costs. Thus, the relative price of consumption in period t falls. As consumers must be lending to
the government in this case, the interest rate effect also tends to lower welfare and marginal
utility must be negative.
By equations (13) and (18), the marginal increase in the discounted value of the budget16
ln[(1 & M)(w0 & N
i
0)/c0 % M(W & Ni)/c] % (1 & M)lnc0 % Mlnc (23)
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where C :' (1 & M)(w0 & N
i
0)/c0 % M(W & Ni)/c,
(25)
B i :' (1 & M)s
i
0 % Ms i ' 0. (24)
Mtnt, where nt :' (1/ct)(1 & QNt % QNtst/N), t ' 0,1,... . (22)
surplus (the left-hand side of equation (18)), that results from a marginal increase in the time-t
tax when taxes are identical across countries is
We show that in equilibrium, a marginal increase in the time-t tax must increase the
discounted value of the government’s stream of budget surpluses.
Proposition 4. A symmetric equilibrium must have nt > 0, t = 0,1 ... .
After the first period, the government smooths taxes.
Proposition 5. A symmetric Nash equilibrium has constant taxes after period zero.
Let ,  ,  and ,  t > 0. Then equations (17) and (18) imply that the N
i
t ' Ni c
i





By equations (13) and (23), the marginal utilities associated with  and N




By equations (13) and (24), the marginal increases in B
i associated with increases in N
i
05In deriving equation (28), both sides were divided by Q. If Q = 0, the timing of taxes is
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N0/(1 % QN0s0/N) ' N/(1 % QNs/N). (28)




If the countries act symmetrically, then equation (16) implies that C = 1. Equation (13)
implies that (W- = and  . These results and equations (25) and N0)/c0 1 & s0 (W & N)/N ' 1 & s
(26) imply 
The first-order conditions for an equilibrium imply m1/m0=n1/n0.This and equations (27)
imply
5
Symmetry and equation (24) imply
The second-order condition requires that the bordered Hessian matrix associated with the
optimisation problem has a strictly positive determinant. This requires6Details available on request.
7The curves are drawn as convex to the origin. This is true if N is sufficiently large, but
















respectively, when taxes are symmetric and where nt0 and nt1 are the derivatives of   (as given n
i
t
by equation (26)) with respect to   and  , respectively, when taxes are symmetric. It is N
i
0 Ni
straightforward, but exceedingly tedious to demonstrate that symmetric taxes which satisfy
equations (28) and (29) also satisfy equation (30).
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Definition 1. A symmetric equilibrium is a pair of taxes {N0,N} such that
(i) the feasibility condition (29) is satisfied
(ii) the optimality condition (28) is satisfied.
We first establish that taxes are always positive.
Proposition 6. An equilibrium cannot have subsidies. ( or ). N0 <0 N <0
We analyse the equilibrium by graphing equations (29) and (28) in Figure 2. This figure
is drawn for strictly positive taxes that are less than the ones that maximise the within-period
discounted surpluses as we have shown that no other taxes can be part of an equilibrium.
The feasibility condition (29) is represented by the solid curves F-,F,and F+;the different
curves representing different initial stocks of debt. By Proposition 4, these curves are downward
sloping; an increase in the future tax allows the government to reduce the current tax and still
balance its budget.
7 The curve representing an initial debt of zero, F0, goes through the point
( ), labelled A. The curve corresponding to a strictly positive stock of initial debt, F+, lies N&,N&
above the curve with zero debt and the curve corresponding to a negative stock of initial debt, F-,19
lies below it. Both curves pass through the point  . With a positive initial stock of debt, this (N
&
0,N&)
point lies above A; with a negative initial stock of debt it lies below A.
The curves representing equation (28) in Figure 2 are represented by the dashed lines. The
curve O0 represents the case of no initial debt or an infinite number of countries. The curves










strictly negative initial debt when N = NN and N = NO, respectively.
Proposition 7.The curves representing the optimality conditions in Figure 2 have the following
properties:
(i) The curve O0 is the 45
o line.
(ii) All of the optimality curves are upward sloping and pass through the origin.
(iii) and lie below the 45










(iv) lies above   when N > N
- and ;    lies below   when N < N










& N0 > N
&
0
The intuition behind the optimality curves in Figure 2 is that the government trades off
two objectives. First, it wants to smooth consumption by smoothing taxes, and hence tax
distortions, over time. If this were its sole objective, optimality would be represented by O0.
Second, it wants to lower the discounted value of the tax collection costs through its influence
on the global rate of interest. If it has an initial stock of debt, it does this by lowering initial taxes
and raising future taxes. Through the global resource constraint (equation (13)) this raises initial
consumption and lowers future consumption, thus lowering the interest rate on government debt
between periods zero and one. Thus, its required tax revenue falls. Likewise, if the government
is an initial creditor it can lower its required discounted tax revenue, and thus its tax collection
costs, by raising initial taxes and lowering future taxes, thus raising the interest rate on
government savings between periods zero and one.20
This second objective means that the curve representing the optimality condition in Figure
2 is flatter than O0 when there is initial debt and it is steeper than O0 when there is an initial
surplus. The more market power a country has (that is, the smaller is N) the greater is its ability
to affect the global interest rate and the more important this second motive becomes. Thus, as the
number of countries falls, the optimality curve becomes flatter if the country is an initial debtor
and steeper if the country is an initial creditor. When N 6 4 countries have no market power.
Only the first objective matters and the optimality equation is represented by O0.
Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the relevant feasibility and optimality curves. We
show that a unique intersection must occur.
Proposition 8. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists.
Different equilibria are represented by the points A - G in Figure 2. Point A is the
equilibrium when there is no initial stock of debt. In this case there is tax smoothing and the
budget is balanced each period. Points B, C and D represent equilibria when there is a positive
stock of initial debt. If N = 4, the equilibrium is represented by point B and there is tax
smoothing. Points C and D lie below the 45
o line; hence, if N < 4 and there is a positive initial
stock of debt, N>N0.As Nfalls, the negative slope of the curve representing equation (29) ensures
that the initial tax declines and the future tax rises.
Likewise, points E, F and G represent equilibria when there is an initial negative stock
of debt. If N=4(point G), there is complete tax smoothing. Points Eand Flie above the 45
oline;
hence, if N < 4 and there is a negative initial stock of debt, N > N0. As N falls, the initial tax rises
and the future tax falls.
These results are summarised below.
Proposition 9.If countries have no market power (N=4)orif the value of the initial debt is zero,
then there is complete tax smoothing. If countries have some market power (N < 4), then the8If the government begins with a strictly positive (negative) initial stock of debt, then
Proposition 9 says that the initial tax is lower (higher) than subsequent taxes. This implies that
the government enters period one with a strictly positive (negative) stock of initial debt. Thus,
if the government could re-optimise, beginning in period one, Proposition 9 implies that it would
set a lower (higher) tax in period one then in later periods. This implies that the equilibrium,
which features constant taxes from period one on, is not time consistent unless R0b0=0.The time
inconsistency arises because the initial debt is taken as exogenous, and hence, unaffected by
taxes.
21
initial tax is strictly less (greater) than the subsequent tax if there is a strictly positive (negative)
stock of initial debt. 
When countries have no market power, we derive the same result as Barro (1979). Taxes
result in resource losses, here because they are costly to collect and in Barro (1979) because they
are distortionary. If these costs are convex, then an optimising government smooths them over
time. If, however, the government can affect the interest rate and it has an initial stock of debt,
then it lowers the discounted value of its required tax revenue by reducing initial taxes and raising
future taxes. If it is an initial creditor it raises its return to its savings by increasing the initial tax
and lowering future taxes.
8
The case of N = 1 corresponds to the social planner’s outcome. Hence, we have the
following result.
Proposition 10. Suppose that N > 1. If there is a positive (negative) initial stock of debt, then the
initial tax is too high (low) relative to the social optimum. The subsequent tax is too low (high)
relative to the social optimum.
If there is a positive stock of initial debt, lowering initial taxes causes a positive
externality by decreasing all country’s borrowing costs. Countries do not take into account the
social benefit and they do not decrease initial costs enough.
4. CES Preferences
The log-linear preference specification of the previous section is a special case of CES9It is easy to generalise the results of the last section to ] < 1, and by continuity
arguments, to ]within a right-hand side neighbourhood of one. It appears analytically intractable
to extend them to ] sufficiently greater than one. In this section we are concerned with marginal
changes at ] = 1.
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0, t ' 1,2,... . (33)
preferences for an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to one. In this section, we look
at how small changes in the value of the elasticity of substitution in the neighbourhood of 1 effect
the results of the last section. Let
where ] is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. As ] 6 1, the above
preferences become the logarithmic specification of the previous sections. We assume that ] is
arbitrarily close to one.
9
Given the above preferences, the Euler equation of the consumer’s optimisation problem
becomes
Solving the difference equation (32) yields the household’s time-t consumption as a
function of its initial consumption and the interest rate 
Averaging both sides of equation (33) across countries yields23
1






















0 % M(W & Ni)/c ]] 1&][(1 & M)c
1&]

















, t ' 1,2,... .. (37)
(1 & M)ˆ s
i




























t , t >0 (35)
Substituting equations (33) and (34) into the household’s budget constraint yields
Substituting equations (33) - (35) into equation (31) and ignoring constants that are
unimportant to the optimisation problem yields the indirect utility function
Substituting equation (34) into the government’s budget constraint (equation (11)) yields
In the previous section we demonstrated that a symmetric equilibrium must have constant
taxes after period zero. Substitute Nt = N into equations (36) and (37) . Then the optimisation
problem of the government is to choose N0 and N to maximise
subject to 24
N0/(1 % Q]N0s0/N) ' N/(1 % Q]Ns/N). (40)
(1 & M)ˆ s0 % Mˆ s ' 0. (41)
The first-order conditions evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium imply
By equation (39) and symmetry
The feasibility constraint and the optimality condition are represented graphically in
Figure 3. In this figure,   represents the feasibility constraint and   represents the optimality F k O k
constraint for the case of ] = ]
k, k = 0,1, where  . The properties of the curves are ]0 < ]1
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 11. The curves F
0 and F





0 lies above F
1 to the left of   and below the 45
o line; it lies below F
1 to the right (N
&
0,N&)
of   andabove the 45
oline. The curves O
0and O




line. The curve O
1 lies below O
0.
To see the properties of the feasibility curves, first suppose there is no initial debt. Then
increasing ] would make the government’s tradeoff over feasible current and future taxes more
favourable. To see the intuition suppose that the government is running a time-zero deficit. It
finances this deficit by borrowing. With lower period-zero taxes than future taxes, consumption
is higher in period zero than in period one. Consumers smooth their consumption by lending to
governments in period zero. This higher is ], the lower is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and the greater is their desire to smooth their consumption. Thus, the higher is ],the
less costly is it for the government to trade off future tax increases for tax cuts in period zero. The
intuition is similar for the case of an initial surplus.
When R0b0 > 0, the government’s tradeoff is more favourable with a higher value of ]10As noted, this theorem is for marginal changes at  . It is straightforward to generalise ]'1
it to large changes for ] < 1, but it is not analytically tractable to consider large changes above
one.
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than with a lower value of ] if consumption is higher is higher in the period in which the
government runs a deficit. With an initial positive stock of debt, however, it is possible for the
country to be running a deficit in period zero, even though consumption is lower in period zero
than in period one. This corresponds to the parts of the curves between the two intersecting
points. In this case, reducing current taxes requires higher future taxes and the higher is ] the
higher are these future taxes. Consumption is made less smooth by the government’s borrowing
and the higher is ], the more the government must pay to borrow. 
To see the shape of the optimality curves, suppose there is an initial stock of government
debt and that taxes are constant across periods. Then the governments run a deficit in the current
period and must borrow. If first-period taxes were lowered, this would increase current
consumption and lower the interest rate that the government must pay on its debt. If this interest
rate effect is taken into account, then taxes will be lower in the first period than if the interest rate
effect is not taken into account. This is the argument of the previous section.
The lower is ], the less consumers want to smooth their consumption and the less is the
interest rate effect. Thus, the bigger is ] the greater is the socially optimal reduction in the first-
period tax below the feasible constant tax.
Given Proposition 11 we have the following.
Proposition 12. Suppose that N > 1. If there is a positive initial stock of debt, then the initial tax
is too high relative to the social optimum and the subsequent taxes are too low relative to the
social optimum. An increase in 7 causes the socially optimal value of the initial tax to fall.
10
As well as considering marginal changes in ]around one, we can consider the polar cases26
where ] goes to zero and to infinity. In the limit as ] falls to zero, there is no interest rate effect
as consumers do not care at all about smoothing their income. Thus, the socially optimal and
uncoordinated outcomes coincide and taxes are smoothed over time. In the limit as ] goes to
infinity, indifference curves for current and future consumption become right angles and only the
minimum consumption matters. If  , cooperating governments should borrow marginally R0b0 >0
less than their outstanding debt in period one and set the current tax marginally higher than the
one that balances the future primary deficit. Current consumption is then marginally lower than
future consumption so the required gross interest rate on the borrowing is zero. The future tax is
thus the one that balances the future primary deficit. Minimum consumption over the current and
future can be made arbitrarily close to W & G & (Q/2)N&2
.
4. Production and capital accumulation
An important simplifying feature of the model is that varying the pattern of taxes over
time (and thereby changing the pattern of real fiscal transfer costs over time) is the only way to
transfer real resources between periods. Households and governments make saving decisions, but
in equilibrium, net global saving (private plus public) is always zero and investment is always
zero for each individual country because real goods are perishable. Reducing taxes in any given
period will increases the real resources available that period. In equilibrium, private consumption
in that period will therefore increase. In our benchmark model, the interest rate on current savings
falls as a result of the current tax cut. 
In this section, we extend the model to allow for production. When capital formation is
added to the model, real resources can be transferred between periods not only by shifting the
pattern of taxation (and of fiscal transfer costs) but also by capital formation.
Formally, we assume that the household has the CES preferences of the last section and
that the single good in the model is both a capital and a private and public consumption good.27
f(k(Rt)) & G & (Q/2)N
2
t & ct & k(Rt%1) ' 0, t ' 0,1,... . (42)
The representative households each supply one unit of labour inelastically each period and save
both bonds and the output of the current good in the form of capital. The savings of capital are
loaned to the firms to be used in the next-period’s production process. The firms transform capital
and labour into output via a Cobb-Douglas production function with a capital share of output of
_ 0 (0,1). Then if k is the capital-labour ratio, the output per unit of labour is f(k) = Ak
8, where
A > 0. We suppose that labour is immobile across countries, physical capital is perfectly mobile
and capital depreciates completely. Then perfect mobility of capital and perfect competition
imply that capital-labour ratios and wages are equalised across countries and
. kt ' k(Rt) ' [A(1 & _)/Rt]1/_
A symmetric equilibrium is characterised by the Euler equation (32), the government
budget constraint (37) and the global resource constraint, which is now 
The model with capital is far more difficult to analyse than the one without. To obtain an
analytical result, we restrict ourselves to a simple experiment. Imagine that the world is at a
symmetric steady state with constant taxes and a positive initial stock of debt. Can policy makers
raise welfare with a coordinated symmetric marginal tax cut? 
Proposition 13. Suppose countries are at a symmetric steady state with constant taxes and
strictly positive debt. Then it is possible to increase welfare with a coordinated marginal tax cut
in the current period.
We show in the proof that welfare is improved if the current tax cut is financed with
future tax rises that leave consumption constant from period one on. The intuition is that lowering
the current tax and raising future taxes raises current consumption and lowers future
consumption, thus lowering the current interest rate as in the previous sections. This lowers the
cost of servicing the debt and reduces future tax collection costs. To see that the interest rate must28
fall, suppose that it did not. Then next period’s marginal product of capital will rise so current
capital accumulation falls. With lower tax collection costs and fixed current output, this implies
current consumption rises. This is inconsistent with the interest rate falling in the current period
unless next period’s, and hence every future period’s, consumption rises by more than current
consumption. However, with lower current capital accumulation and higher future tax collection
costs this is impossible. Thus, we have a contradiction.
Conclusion.
We have demonstrated that, in our baseline model, optimising governments will perfectly
smooth taxes if they have no market power or if they have no initial debt. If countries are large
enough to affect the world interest, then they will set lower taxes in the current period than in the
future if they have a positive initial stock of debt. If they have an initial stock of credit they will
set higher taxes in the current period than in the future.
We show that, relative to the first-best, co-operative outcome, with positive initial debt,
countries set their current taxes too high. Thus, relative to the optimum, initial budget deficits are
too low. Similarly, if countries are initial creditors, initial budget deficits are too high.
We extend our baseline model, which features log-linear preferences, to the case of CES
preferences. We show that a marginal fall in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases
the deviation between the uncoordinated outcome and the first-best outcome; a marginal rise
decreases the deviation. We also consider the case of production and capital accumulation. We
show that if there is a steady state with constant taxes and strictly positive debt, then it is possible
to increase welfare with a coordinated cut in the current tax.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show this for t > 0; the proof for t = 0 is similar. 
A tax that maximises  must be in [N
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1/Q, > 0; when   =  N
+, < 0; hence (43) has a solution on [1/Q,N
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decreasing above the maximising tax.
It is obvious from (43) and (44) that the maximising tax is decreasing in N and goes to
1/Q as N goes to 4.
Proof of Proposition 2.Suppose to the contrary that ›t >0such that at least one of the countries
sets its tax on the “wrong” side of the net tax revenue curve. Without loss of generality, suppose
the country with the highest tax is country i and let   = N
W. We suppose t > 0; the argument for N
i
t
t = 0 is similar. Let  , the average tax in the other countries in period t, be given. Let s
W be the ˆ N
value of   at N
W. Let N
* be the tax that maximises  , let the value of   at this tax be s







positive value of   for which ct = 0 be . Then  >  and s
W 0 . We have that  , N
i
t YN ( NW N( (&4,s () s
i
t
maps  onto  ; hence, › 0 (- ) such that  = s
W at N
R. By equation (18), a (&N(,N()( &4,s () NR YN (,N( s
i
t
switch from   to  has no effect on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and, NW NR
hence, does not require a change in any other tax. Thus, the government prefers   to  if NR NW
indirect utility (given by (17) is higher when   than when  .  N
i
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We have  ; hence, c
R>c
W,where c




t ' Nk, k ' R,W
indirect utility is higher when   than when   if  >  . By N
i
t ' NR N
i
t ' NW (W & N
R
t )/c R (W & NW)/c W
(13),
Thus, we need to show that  . By (13), this is true iff   <  which (ˆ N2 & NR 2
)/c R >( ˆ N2 & NW 2
)/c W ˆ NY N
must be the case as the other countries have lower taxes than country i. As the country with the
highest tax cannot set its tax on the wrong side of the net tax revenue curve, then neither can any
other country.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose t > 0. By (21), mt cannot be positive unless Ntst < 0. By
Proposition 1, Nt 0 ]- ; hence, mt cannot be positive unless Nt 0 ]0, ]. In this case, mt < 0 Y N,N(N] N&





at N iff ›N such that LN(N) = N - (3Q/2)N
2 - G = 0 and LO(N) = 1 - 3QN > 0. If 1 - 6QG < 0, then no
such N exits and L(0) = L(N
-) = W - G > 0 ensures the proposition holds. If 1 - 6QG $ 0, then an
interior minimum exists. It is sufficient to show that L is strictly positive at this point. Using
(3Q/2)N
2 = N - G, we have L(N) = W - G + (Q/2)N(N - QN
2 - 2G) = (1/3)[3(W - G) + (Q/2)N(N - 4G)]
=(1/9)[9W-10G+(1 - 6QG)N]. Assumption (19) ensures 9W>10G;hence this is true. The proof
for t = 0 is similar.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose to the contrary that ›u $ 0 such that, nu < 0. By Proposition 1
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N(1 & M)(N & N0) ' QNN0s. (46)
Proposition 3 ensures that utility rises. Thus   cannot be part of an equilibrium. This is a Nu
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose to the contrary that  . If the government of Nu < Nv, u,v $ 1
country i marginally increases Nu, changing N




+ , where d = . Then du




v & Mu&v(nu/nv)dNu Mu(mu mvnu/nv)dN
i
u
> 0; hence, country i would defect from the equilibrium if mu/nu > mv/nv. This is true if mt/nt is
strictly decreasing in Nt. By (21) and (22), this is true if Nt/(1 +  is increasing in Nt. This QNtst/N)
is true if 1 > (Q /N) . Proposition 4 and (18) ensure that  > 0 in an equilibrium. ￿
2
t dst /dNt dst/dNt
Thus, if Nt < 0 the result must hold. Suppose Nt > 0. We show the result holds when t > 0; the
proof for t = 0 is similar.






t [0,N(1] g [0,N(N]
hand side is negative, this is true. If it is positive, it is true if it is true for N = 1. This is true if
G(N) :=  > 0 œN 0 [0, ]. For G to have an interior minimum (Y N2 & N2)2 & 2N2(Y N2 & 2WN % N2) N(1
on [0, ] requires (3W- )/2 # . By the definition of  , this is impossible. G(0) N(1 9W 2 & 8YN 2 N(1 N(1
= > 0 and  > 0; hence G > 0 œN 0 [0, ]. Y N4 G(N(1) ' (Y N2 & N(12
)2 N(1
Proof of Proposition 6. Assumption (19) rules out negative taxes in both periods. Rearranging
(28) yields  . Substituting in  = -M/(1 - M) (from (29)) yields N(N0 & N) ' QNN0(s0 & s) s0/s
Suppose  . Then (19) and (29)imply s > 0. The left-hand side of (46) is N >0>N0
positive, the right-hand side is negative. This is a contradiction. Suppose  . Then s < N0 >0>N
0, the left-hand side of (46) is negative and the right-hand side is positive. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let the right-hand side of (28) be represented by h(N;N) := N(1 + QNs/N)
> 0 for N 0 [0,N
*1]; the left-hand side by h0(N0;N) := N(1 + QN0s0/N) > 0 for N0 0 [0, .] These N
(1
032
functions have the following properties:
(a) h(0;N) ' h0(0;N) ' 0
(b)  . (The first inequality follows from an argument in the dh(N;N)/dN >0 ;dh0(N0;N)/dN0)>0
proof of Proposition 5, the second by a similar argument)
(c)   when  N<(=,>) N
- when N0<(=,>) . h(N;N ))>( ',<) h(N;N ))), h0(N0;N ))>( ',<) h0(N0;N ))) N
&
0
(d)   when   > (=,<) 0. h0(N;N)>( ',<) h(N;N) R0b0
Result (i) follows from (d) and  when N 6 4. Result (ii) follows from (a) and (b). h0(N) 6 h(N)
Result (iii) follows from (b) and (d). Result (iv) follows from (b) and (c).
Proof of Proposition 8. Uniqueness follows from the strictly negative slope of the feasibility
curves and the positive slope of the optimality curves. 
Suppose R0b0 $ 0. An equilibrium fails to exist iff the F+ curve lies above  at the O
N
%
highest period-1 tax that is consistent with equilibrium,  . By (43), this tax satisfies 1 - Q N(N N(N
+ Q = 0, where   denotes  s, evaluated at this tax. Thus, the right-hand side of (28) N(Ns (N/Ns (N
evaluated at   equals 1/Q. For (28) to hold, (43) implies that   =  . Assumption (19) N(N N0 N
(N
0
implies that surpluses are positive in both periods at the point  . Hence, this point must (N
(N
0 ,N(N)
lie above F+ and an equilibrium exists. The proof for R0b0 < 0 is similar. 
Proof of Proposition 11.Let ,  ,  c(N):= W-G- f(N): ' N & (Q/2)N2 & g f0(N): ' N & (Q/2)N2 & g0
(Q/2)N
2 and .  Then  F
k represents the feasibility B(N0,N;]): ' (1 & M)f0(N0)/c(N0)] % Mf(N)/c(N)]
constraint when ] = ]




0,N&;]1) ' 0 B(N,N;]0) B(N,N,]1)
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0and F
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and  > (<) 1. This is true iff  and  or  and  . c(N
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0)/c(N)) N) > N& N
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0 < N) N) < N& N
)
0 > N)
Redefine the curves hand h0in Proposition 7 as h(N;]):= N(1 + ]QNs/N)and h0(N0;]):= N(1
+ ]QN0s0/N). It is easy to establish that property (b) in Proposition continues to hold if ] < 1 and33
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MtdNt % b0dc0/c & b0dc/c ' 0. (49)
(by a continuity argument) if ] is sufficiently close to one. In addition, property (d) holds and h
is decreasing in ] when   and  h0 is increasing n ] when  . These properties ensure N > N& N0 < N&
that the O
0 and O
1 have the stated properties. 
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose the initial tax is less than 1/Q, and hence is on the “right” side
of the tax revenue curve. If this were not true, with constant taxes welfare could be improved by
moving to the lower revenue-equivalent tax. Let the initial period be denoted by t = 0. Suppose
the coordinated marginal fall in the initial tax   is financed by a sequence of future tax dN0 <0




t ' dct ' dc, t
initial steady state yields
Differentiating (37) and evaluating at the initial steady state yields
At a steady state the gross interest rate must equal 1/M.Thus, evaluating (37) at the steady
state yields  . Substituting this into (48) yields  s ' (1 & M)b0/(Mc)34





















dR1 ' ](dc & dc0)/(Mc), dRt ' 0 t ' 2,3... . (50)
QNdN0 ' ](dc & dc0)k1/(_c) & dc0
QNdN1 '&](dc & dc0)k1/(_Mc) & dc
QNdNt '&dc, t ' 2,3... .
(51)
Differentiating (32) and evaluating at the steady state yields
Differentiating (42), employing   and  , substituting in (42) f )(kt) ' Rt dkt/dRt '&kt/(_Rt)
and (49) and evaluating at a steady state yields 
Substituting (51) into (48) yields 
Substituting (52) into (47) yields that utility rises if and only if true iff 
The second expression is true by N < 1/Q. This gives us our result.35
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